Cliff # 1

About cliffeconomics

This blog offers original economic thought and policy recommendations on Germany, the euro area, and whatever cliff has on his mind.

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Friday, September 30, 2011

Privatization-panacea

Privatization is often thought of as below-the-line savior to the debt problems in the euro area. But a crisis may not the right time to privatize, other than to raise liquidity that cannot be obtained else. From a flow perspective, it would always make sense to hold on to assets that have a higher return than the liabilities, rather than disposing of the asset to pay down debt. From a stock perspective, both assets and liabilities suffer in times of crisis, so depending on the relative drop in value privatization may or may not become more attractive. Usually, prices of equity reacts more strongly than debt to a downturn, but in a situation in which debt is so risky that it resembles equity, the logic may not hold. For Spain, it makes financially sense to hold off with the Loteria privatization from a flow perspective, and (given ECB’s interventions) also from a stock...

Sunday, September 25, 2011

Overlooked factors in the discussion of Eurobonds

Often the argument is brought forward that Eurobonds will be expensive for Germany. The bonds would have higher yields than German Bunds given that  weaker debtors are aggregated into one issuer. Here are two counterarguments. (A third one, higher liquidity, has been made in abundance already.) First, credit fundamentals do not suggest that the euroarea as a whole is less solvent than Germany (see table). Debt levels, cyclically adjusted primary balances, and long-term contingent liabilities from pension and health are roughly on level with Germany. If pre-crisis convergence growth would be restored, the euroarea as a whole would grow faster...

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Economics 1-ohhh-1: Ways to resolve a debt overhang

Without implication, imagine there is a small country within a currency union. This country, let's call it Olive, suffers from too high debt and a liquidity crisis. Imagine there is another, large and solvent country that is called Oak. And on top of that, assume politicians really want to end the crisis. This sounds like a distant imagination, doesn't it? What can be done? Debt crises can be overcome in two ways: (i) growth and (ii) transfers, whereby transfers can take a zillion different shapes with different distributional effects, in particular: (a) inflation, (b) grants by Oak to Olive, (c) default by Olive. Growth is a first-best solution. Instead of producing traditional olives, a coincidental invention allows olive trees to grow gourmet olives with incredibly better taste. The resulting jump in value creation allows Olive to raise more taxes and pay off its...

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Number of the day: Greece deficit

Projected fiscal deficit of Greece in percent of Germany's GDP: 0.8. Second bailout package in percent of Germany's GDP: 4.6. Memorandum: Marshall Plan in percent of US' GDP: 5...

ECB's Securities Market Program is fiscal action in disguise

The ECB's Securities Market Program (SMP) is, as shown by last weeks resignation of Jürgen Stark, controversial. One striking argument in favor of intervening in sovereign markets is the analogy to a lender of last resort (LOLR), a liquidity backstop central banks provide to banks (see Paul Grauwe's VOX contribution). Yet, I think a stringend application of the analogy points to something else than the SMP as currently implemented. Here are my points: (i) Prevent self-fulfilling runs. The LOLR function is intended to prevent the collapse of systemic institutions that are vulnerable to self-fulfilling prophecies. In other words, banks are given a backstop because they are believed to be vulnerable to irrational bank runs. Does the analogy hold to self-fulfilling sovereign debt crises? Secondary market purchases do not provide liquidity to the issuer, but...